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Summary: 
I examine the universalization of long-term care services and supports (LTCSS) in the three 
leading European countries that have reformed their funding for LTCSS in the last 10-15 years. 
More specifically, I examine the Scottish and Spanish reforms which extended public insurance 
to everyone needs needing LTCSS, and the Dutch reform, which in contrast rolled back the 
converge of the older funding system in Europe.  I argue that universal systems entail savings to 
the health system and improve financial wellbeing of families, yet, specific designs can stimulate 
beneficiaries moral hazard, and weaken government welfare budgets. 
 
Keywords: long-term care services and supports, Europe, Scotland, Spain and the 
Netherlands.  
 
  
 
1.    Introduction 
Some European countries have moved to universalize the access to long-term care 
services and supports (LTCSS). This has taken place with a  public mandate to the reception of  
subsidies either in term of residential, home or nursing home care, or in cash with the 
development of caregiving allowances which in some countries have been conditional  which 
have adopted several formats form personal budgets in the Netherlands, to conditional 
allowances in the Scotland to unconditional allowances in Spain. The universalization of long-
term care refers to access to care, and hence entail partial financing. This means individuals still 
have to co-finance part of their care except for individuals who fall behind income thresholds 
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that obtain additional means-tested support.  The funding comes from income or payroll taxes 
and opens an opportunity for insurance markets to contribute to complement public funding 
such as in France and Germany, or for individuals to self-insure by using their housing assets 
typically to pay for care typical in Southern Europe (Costa-Font et al., 2010).   
 
The main reasons for the universalization on the first place include making sure that 
women participate in the labor market, especially in Northern countries, and to support 
struggling families, mainly in Southern European countries (Costa-Font et al., 2015). In both 
cases, as we discuss below, that there were significant welfare effect for households financial 
wellbeing, and savings in the use of health care. However, in the middle of an economic crisis, 
long-term care subsidies might be seen as an opportunity to increase household income. Hence 
new subsidy applications can soar and thus, weaken the financial sustainability of the system.  
 
This paper will focus on examining the three main widespread reforms in European that 
have taken place in the last decade and a half, namely the reforms in Scotland and Spain which 
universalized the access to the public subsidy for long-term care services and supports (LTCSS), 
which was means tested before. In contrast, the Netherlands that reduced the public subsidy. 
Below I will discuss the challenges they are facing and point out what are the mean weaknesses 
of the specific design that extended and lowered the coverage of for long-term care. This article 
argues that universal subsidization of LTCSS when it expands the network of services, it reduces 
the utilization of hospital care,  affects caregiving choices, especially when cash subsidies are 
available for informal care. I argue that the experience of the three countries provides some 
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lessons for countries that have not yet universalized the entitlement to such supports. For 
instance, in the US context, some states might consider universalizing Medicaid to support the 
entire population in need of long-term care. However, these reforms would allow people to 
purchase additional insurance. I argue that needs tests are the main instrument to monitor 
demand i. Nonetheless, once a subsidy in place, even though when not working as expected,  the 
Dutch experience shows that is complex to dismantle.  
 
 
In what follows we briefly describe the Scottish, Spanish and Dutch reforms and we 
conclude the article with a  discussion of the main lessons from such reforms.  
 
 
2.    The Scottish Free Personal Care (FPC) 
 
The funding LTCSS  has been at the centre of social policy reforms the Royal Commission 
on long-term care in 1999 recommended for the UK as a whole a system of free long-term care. 
The Commission established a clear need to reform and was explicitly concerned with the 
inequity in the access to LTCSS. However, the recommendation of the Commission was adopted 
only in Scotland in 2002, two years after health and social care responsibilities were devolved to 
the Scottish government. Scotland, unlike the rest of the UK, reformed the funding of personal 
care  in the Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act by introducing ‘free' personal care (FPC) 
which meant that all charges for personal care at home were abolished, although charges 
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continued in place for non-personal care expenses (Glendinning et al., 2004; Bell and Bowes, 
2006). An increased flat-rate conditional subsidy  (attendance allowance) for personal care was 
raised (in 2014 it entail a flat rate payment of £169 per week for those at home, and those who 
receive care in a nursing home receive an additional £77).  
 
The reform universalised the access to long-term care, but the subsidy was limited, and 
overall the total costs of free personal care amounted to 0.2 per cent of Scottish GDP (Bell and 
Bowes, 2006). The reform replaced the pre-existing model, still in place in the rest of the UK, of 
means-tested care whereby local authorities support only individuals whose wealth does not 
exceed 23,000 pounds. Additional funds were made available to local authorities on an annual 
recurrent basis to pay for FPC. The other costs of providing free personal care for the elderly 
increased this amount by around 10% after the reform (Bell and Bowes, 2006).  
 
Reforms in Scotland took place alongside an incentive to provide informal care as health 
and social care integration policy focus on enabling older adults to remain in their own homes 
when possible (Scotish Government, 2016). Hence,  the introduction of FPC did give rise to a 
change in caregiving choices. More specifically, some evidence suggests an increase in informal 
caregiving by six percental points (Kalsberg-Scaffer, 2015). A recent study using administrative 
data to evaluate some trends after the introduction of FPC in Scotland and other countries (Bell 
and Bowes, 2012) finds evidence of a sharp increase in home help demand by 69% between 2002-
2010, which was compensated by an increase in the charges for non-personal care, and the 
intensity of care increased from an average of 6.9 to 7.8.  
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3.    The Spanish universalization of LTCSS 
Like Scotland, Spain expanded the public funding of LTCSS  in 2007 as the star reform a 
newly and unexpectedly elected government after it passed the  ‘Promotion of Personal 
Autonomy and Care of Dependent People’ Bill 39/2006 (we refer to it using the acronym SAAD, 
in Spanish). Although the central government lead the reform, the design is system is highly 
decentralised and is funded by matching funds of regional and central governments (similar to 
the way Medicaid is still funded in the US).  Although originally the design contemplates a user 
co-payment although it is unevenly implemented. Before the introduction of SAAD, the provision 
of LTC was means tested and funded by local authorities. After SAAD, the subsidy designed in 
follows the German long-term care system, and applicants are subject to a ‘needs test’ and 
classified into one of the three dependency levels (‘moderate’, ‘severe’ or major dependency) 
according to an official ranking scale. An individual’s care plan is designed to match the 
applicant’s needs and those of its family. Finally, individuals had a choice between in kinds (some 
subsidised weekly hours of care at home, or in daycare or nursing homes) or, an unconditional 
caregiving allowance. 
 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of the percentage of beneficiaries of SAAD claiming caregiving allowances 2008-2015  
 
 6 
 
Source: Costa-Font et al (2017) Data retrieved from  http://www.dependencia.imserso.es/dependencia_01/index.htm 
 
 
Caregiving allowance is designed to compensate informal caregivers (including social security 
contributions), yet the allowances in 2011 for major dependency could amount  530€ in 2011 
and 300€ for severely disabled which compare to a minimum wage of 641.40 €/month. Hence, 
there was a strong moral hazard incentive, and as we show in Figure 1,  a few months after the 
implementation of SAAD, about 50% of its beneficiaries were claiming caregiving allowances. 
Costa-Font et al. (2017a) show that SAAD incentivised informal caregiving as in Scotland, and 
lead to an increased to transfers to help children amidst an economic recession and, Costa-Font 
and Vilaplana-Prieto (2017) shows that it lead to changes on saving decisions (reduced savings).  
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However, part of the above results can be explained by the fact that a year after the SAAD 
Spain underwent into an economic recession, (increasing the country’s public deficit to 8.9% of 
GDP in 2012). It only in July 2012 that the system was adjusted to reduce the strong moral 
hazard incentive spending cuts (amounting 15-25% of the subsidy) as well delays in the SAAD 
entitlements in July 2012 (Royal Decree 20/2012, 13 July 2012), and more stringent needs tests 
by some regional governments. However, the implementation of SAAD reduced the so-called 
‘bed blocking’  and admission in hospitals which is estimated to have reduced hospital health 
care costs by an average of 11% (Costa-Font et al., 2018). Hence, as with the Scottish reform, 
evidence from Spain suggests mixed evidence of success, which depended on its design.  
 
4.    The Netherlands: fragmentation and tighter budgets 
The final country reform we examine is that of the Netherlands stands out as a contrasting 
example to the previous two reforms. The Dutch long-term care system is the oldest in Europe, 
and up until 2015 it was the most generous in Europe after Sweden, in part because it relied 
too heavily on residential care, and (Alders et al., 2015). As some other European systems, is 
funded by a single payroll contribution, eligibility of benefits is determined by an assessment of 
care need. As in the Scottish and Spanish case, the system offers both benefits in kind and cash, 
but in the latter case, they refer to conditional allowances that follow a detailed personal 
budget.  However, in the aftermath of the economic downturn, the  escalating costs of LTC as 
well as concerns about moral hazard in the system, in January 2015, the Social Support Act 
2015  created a new more restricted funding scheme where the old statutory insurance (AWBZ)  
becomes WLZ with more las limited to funding  and restricted to residential care and provides 
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personal budgets that are heavily surveilled (Maarse et al., 2016).  Nursing care was integrated 
into the statutory health insurance scheme, and non-residential services are now managed by a 
new less generous fund (WMO),  the responsibility of which is shifted to the municipalities.   
 
Although the reform mas a major restricting of the funding of LTC in the Netherlands, it was 
significantly softened in part because reform gives rise to strategic behaviours – as the Scottish 
and Spanish example show- altering caregiving decisions. This is because elderly individuals 
often would not have adequate housing to receive care at home and, in part because the new 
fragmented system opens up new coordination problems that were not present in the old 
system (von Ginneken and Kroneman, 2015). The net effect of the reform reducing coverage 
has not resulted in significant savings to the system because, although 30% savings were 
originally envisaged, the system required additional funding (Maarse et al., 2016).    
 
5.    Lessons for the US 
The universalization of long-term care services and supports (LTCSS) in Scotland, Spain and the 
Netherlands contains some lessons for countries that have not yet universalized the 
entitlement to such supports. More specifically, the Scottish and Spanish reforms extended 
public insurance to everyone, hence universalising the access to LTCSS. However, the funding 
was limited, and its designed did alter caregiving decisions, especially in Spain where the reform 
coincided with an economic downturn. Another lesson from both the Spanish and the Scottish 
reforms is that it has shifted the balance of care towards care at home, rather than residential 
care which explains in part why it has been affordable. Finally, there were clearly important 
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knock-on effects on the health system, and improvements in the financial wellbeing of 
households that carry the burden of caregiving.  In contrast, in the Netherlands, concerns about 
the escalating costs lead to a reform increasing the fragmentation of the system which although 
it was supposed to bring some savings, they failed to materialise. The system became after the 
reform harder to navigate albeit decentralisation made it more accountable to local demands. 
 
Altogether European evidence suggests that in extending public insurance for LTCSS, one needs 
to pay particular attention to the micro-design of the system, and especially the incentives that 
changes in caregiving allowances entail. However, a system that has an integrated form of 
funding like a ‘universal Medicaid’ with limited subsidies depending on need would have in the 
US context. It would reduce the fragmentation of the system and could be designed to reduce 
health care costs, alongside allow for the development of a market for complementary or 
supplementary insurance (e,g., Medigap for LTCSS). As always, cross country lessons should be 
taken with a 'pinch of salt' and some imagination. 
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